And, if we have any evidence that the wisdom which formed the plan is in the man, we have the very same evidence, that the power which executed it is in him also.
In the strict and proper sense, I take an efficient cause to be a being who had power to produce the effect, and exerted that power for that purpose.
Every indication of wisdom, taken from the effect, is equally an indication of power to execute what wisdom planned.
The rules of navigation never navigated a ship. The rules of architecture never built a house.
But when, in the first setting out, he takes it for granted without proof, that distinctions found in the structure of all languages, have no foundation in nature; this surely is too fastidious a way of treating the common sense of mankind.
A philosopher is, no doubt, entitled to examine even those distinctions that are to be found in the structure of all languages... in that case, such a distinction may be imputed to a vulgar error, which ought to be corrected in philosophy.
It is a question of fact, whether the influence of motives be fixed by laws of nature, so that they shall always have the same effect in the same circumstances.
The laws of nature are the rules according to which the effects are produced; but there must be a cause which operates according to these rules.
There is no greater impediment to the advancement of knowledge than the ambiguity of words.
It follows also, that the active power, of which only we can have any distinct conception, can be only in beings that have understanding and will.
When, therefore, in common language, we speak of having an idea of anything, we mean no more by that expression, but thinking of it.
But I have never seen any proof that there are such laws of nature, far less any proof that the strongest motive always prevails.